

BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
L. Timothy Fisher (State Bar No. 191626)
Yeremey O. Krivoshey (State Bar No. 295032)
1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940
Walnut Creek, CA 94596
Telephone: (925) 300-4455
Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
E-Mail: ltfisher@bursor.com
ykrivoshey@bursor.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

JONATHAN RETTA, KIRSTEN
SCHOFIELD, and JESSICA MANIRE
on Behalf of Themselves and all Others
Similarly Situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MILLENNIUM PRODUCTS, INC., and
WHOLE FOODS MARKET, INC.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:15-cv-01801-PSG-AJW

**PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR FINAL
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT AND
CERTIFICATION OF
SETTLEMENT CLASS**

Date: July 31, 2017
Time: 1:30 p.m.
Courtroom 880

Judge: Hon. Philip S. Gutierrez

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1 Plaintiffs Jonathan Retta, Kirsten Schofield, and Jessica Manire (“Plaintiffs”
2 or “Class Representatives”) respectfully submit this memorandum in support of
3 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement.

4 **I. INTRODUCTION**

5 On January 31, 2017, this Court granted preliminary approval to the Parties’
6 Settlement Agreement and ordered that the Settlement Administrator execute the
7 approved Notice Plan. *See* 1/31/17 Order Granting Preliminary Approval (Doc.
8 115). The tremendous success of the Notice Plan and response from Class Members
9 confirms that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and provides outstanding relief to the
10 Class.

11 Should the Court award Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees,
12 Reimbursement of Expenses, and Payment of Incentive Awards, the entire \$8.25
13 million Settlement Fund will be exhausted. *See* 6/19/2017 Decl. of Steven Weisbrot
14 (“Weisbrot Decl.”) ¶ 16. The exhaustion of an entire claims-made settlement fund of
15 this size is no easy feat. Plaintiffs would not have been able to negotiate a settlement
16 fund in this amount as a true “common fund,” where Defendants would have been
17 guaranteed to forfeit \$8.25 million. Instead, Plaintiffs succeeded in negotiating a
18 “claims made” \$8.25 million fund with an *outstanding notice program* – one that
19 was clearly successful in enticing sufficient claims to exhaust the entire fund.
20 Although the Settlement Administrator is still in the process of conducting audits to
21 identify the total final number of timely and valid claims, Angeion estimates that it
22 has received roughly 173,000 timely and valid Claim Form submissions. *Id.* ¶ 14.
23 The Settlement Administrator also estimates that the notice program “delivered an
24 approximate 87% reach” – far higher than is commonly required in low-cost
25 consumer goods settlements. Despite the success of the notice program, to date, no
26 objections have been filed and only two persons opted out. *Id.* ¶ 17.

1 Indeed, Plaintiffs predicted with almost pinpoint accuracy the amount of
2 money needed to award all claimants their full Claim amounts *and* simultaneously
3 exhaust the entire \$8.25 million fund. As discussed below, Class Members who
4 submitted timely and valid claims will only receive a 10 percent pro rata
5 diminishment of their submitted claims to account for the high amount of claims and
6 notice and claims administration expenses, such that the entire \$8.25 million fund
7 will be exhausted. *Id.* ¶ 16.¹ Thus, despite the high number of claims (and the
8 associated higher claims administration costs), each Class Member that submitted a
9 timely and valid claim will still receive up to \$31.50 for up to 10 Subject Products
10 without proof of purchase. As the Court previously noted, these amounts “*vastly*
11 *exceed[] the potential recovery at trial based on a price premium model.*” *See*
12 1/31/17 Order Granting Preliminary Approval at 11 (emphasis added).

13 The Court has already held that the “settlement amount falls within the range
14 of approval” and approved the Notice Plan, which, as discussed below, performed 20
15 percent better than expected. 1/31/17 Order Granting Preliminary Approval at 12.
16 Now that it is plain that the entire fund will be exhausted and that the Notice Plan
17 was a success, the Court should grant final approval, certify the Settlement Class,
18 and enter the Final Approval Order in the form submitted herewith.

19 **II. THE STANDARD FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION**
20 **SETTLEMENTS**

21 “The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled ... only
22 with the court’s approval.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). The Court may finally approve a
23 class settlement “only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and
24

25 ¹ The Settlement Agreement explicitly authorizes pro rata reductions based on the
26 exhaustion of the Settlement fund *and* where Settlement Administration Expenses
27 exceed \$400,000. *See* Stipulation of Class Action Settlement, ¶¶ 46, 48 (The
28 Settlement Agreement is attached to the 11/18/16 L. Timothy Fisher Declaration in
Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement
(Doc. 103-3)).

1 adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2); *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of*
2 *City & Cty. of San Francisco*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). To assess whether
3 a proposed settlement comports with Rule 23(e), a district court “may consider some
4 or all” of the following factors: (1) the strength of plaintiff’s case; (2) the risk,
5 expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of
6 maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in
7 settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed, and the stage of the proceedings;
8 (6) the experience and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental
9 participant; and (8) the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.
10 *Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948, 963 (9th Cir. 2009); *see also Hanlon v.*
11 *Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). No single factor is the “most
12 significant.” *Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 625.

13 In addition, “[a]dequate notice is critical to court approval of a class settlement
14 under Rule 23(e).” *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1025.

15 **III. CLASS CERTIFICATION**

16 The Ninth Circuit has recognized that certifying a settlement class to resolve
17 consumer lawsuits is a common occurrence. *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1019. When
18 presented with a proposed settlement, a court must first determine whether the
19 proposed settlement class satisfies the requirements for class certification under Rule
20 23. In assessing those class certification requirements, a court may properly consider
21 that there will be no trial. *Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor*, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997)
22 (“Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court
23 need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management
24 problems ... for the proposal is that there be no trial.”).

25 In its Order Granting Preliminary Approval, the Court found that “Plaintiffs
26 have met the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a), in addition to
27 Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirements that the case present questions of law and fact common
28

1 to all members of the class that predominate over individual questions, and that class
2 treatment is the superior method of adjudication.” 1/31/17 Order Granting
3 Preliminary Approval, at 6 (Doc. 115). Notably, no objections have challenged that
4 conclusion. The Court may rely on the same rationale as explained in its Order to
5 find that class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b) in
6 connection with final approval. *See In re Netflix Privacy Litig.*, 2013 WL 1120801,
7 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013) (“Because the Objections do not appear to raise a
8 viable challenge to th[e] conclusion [that certification of a settlement class is
9 appropriate], the Court will rely on the rationale for class certification as explained in
10 the Preliminary Approval Order.”). Here, for the same reasons set forth below and in
11 the Order Granting Preliminary Approval, the Settlement Class meets the
12 requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b).

13 **A. The Requirements Of Rule 23(a) Are Met**

14 To achieve class certification, the proposed class must meet the numerosity,
15 commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation requirements of Federal
16 Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). *See Staton v. Boeing Co.*, 327 F.3d 938, 953 (9th Cir.
17 2003). In its Order Granting Preliminary Approval, the Court already concluded that
18 Rule 23(a)’s requirements have been met. *See* 1/31/17 Order Granting Preliminary
19 Approval at 3-5 (Doc. 115).

20 First, the class definition is estimated to cover millions of consumers.
21 “Numerosity is therefore easily satisfied here.” *Id.* at 3 (citing *Monterrubio v. Best*
22 *Buy Stores, L.P.*, 291 F.R.D. 443, 449 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“In this case, there are
23 approximately 3,559 members in the proposed class. This number clearly meets the
24 numerosity requirement, as joinder of over three thousand plaintiffs would be
25 impossible.”)).

26 Second, all of the Class Members’ claims arise from a common nucleus of
27 facts and are based on the same legal theories. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants
28

1 mislabeled the Subject Products by (1) using the term “antioxidant” on the labels
2 when the products allegedly do not contain antioxidant nutrients, (2) labeling the
3 products as non-alcoholic when in fact they allegedly contain two to seven times the
4 amount of alcohol permitted for non-alcoholic beverages, and (3) allegedly
5 understating the sugar content of the products. Further, all of the legal theories
6 asserted by Plaintiffs are common to all Class Members. As this Court held, “the
7 common claims and questions demonstrate ... the existence of common issues of fact
8 and theories of law as to whether Defendants engaged in unlawful false advertising
9 or unfair competition by mislabeling the Subject Products. Commonality is therefore
10 satisfied.” *Id.* at 4.

11 Third, the claims of the Class Representatives are typical of the Class’ claims
12 because “Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of their purchase of Subject Products based on
13 allegedly false or misleading labeling.” *Id.* “Thus, these claims are same or similar
14 to those of other Class Members, who are also consumers of the Subject Products
15 and harmed by the alleged misleading labeling.” *Id.* “Because Plaintiffs’ claims and
16 those of the proposed class all arise from the same alleged misleading labeling,
17 typicality is satisfied.” *Id.*

18 Finally, this Court has already concluded that the named Plaintiffs and their
19 counsel satisfy the adequacy requirement:

20 In this case, there is no apparent conflict of interest between Plaintiffs and the
21 putative class members. Plaintiffs and the class members share the same
22 complaint that Defendants misstated the alcohol, antioxidant and sugar content
23 on the Subject Products. Plaintiffs are members of the class they seek to
24 represent and seek a remedy for the same alleged wrongdoing under identical
25 facts and legal theories. The Court therefore does not discern a potential for a
26 conflict of interest.

25 Furthermore, Plaintiffs are represented by a law firm with extensive
26 experience in class actions suits. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ attorneys have
27 represented millions of consumers in complex class actions, product liability,
28 and consumer fraud cases. As such, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs’
Counsel has adequate experience to represent the class. Moreover, Plaintiffs

1 and their counsel have been effectively prosecuting this action since March of
2 2015, engaging in extensive investigation, negotiation and mediation in order
3 to bring the case to proposed settlement. There is no indication that they will
4 cease these efforts throughout the settlement process. Accordingly, the
5 adequacy requirement is satisfied.

6 *Id.* at 5 (citations omitted). Since the Court granted preliminary approval, Class
7 Counsel has overseen an effective notice program, and it is now apparent that the
8 entire Settlement Fund will be exhausted. Clearly, Class Counsel and the named
9 Plaintiffs are adequate.

10 **B. The Requirements Of Rule 23(b) Are Met**

11 Under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must find “that questions of law or fact
12 common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
13 members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
14 efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). This Court has
15 already held “that Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirements have been met,” noting that Rule
16 23(b)(3) “is more flexible in some respects when applied to a motion for settlement-
17 only class certification.” *Id.* at 5-6. As this Court found, “the material issue in this
18 case – whether Defendants misstated the alcohol, antioxidant and sugar contents on
19 the labels of the Subject Products – is common to the entire class, and predominates
20 over any individual issues which might exist. *Id.* at 6. “Furthermore, the Court
21 [found] that a class action is the superior method for adjudicating this controversy.”
22 *See id.* “Requiring thousands of class members to litigate their claims separately
23 would be inefficient and costly, resulting in duplicative and potentially conflicting
24 proceedings.” *Id.* “Accordingly ... the class action is the superior method for
25 adjudicating the controversy.” *Id.* “The requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are therefore
26 satisfied.” *Id.*

1 **IV. THE SETTLEMENT NOTICE PROGRAM HAS BEEN COMPLETED**
2 **AND THE INITIAL CLASS MEMBER RESPONSE HAS BEEN**
3 **POSITIVE**

4 In its January 31, 2017 Order, after an evaluation of the Settlement’s proposed
5 Notice plan, the Court found “that the Notice complies with the requirements of Fed.
6 R. Civ. P. 23(c).” *Id.* at 15. Accordingly, the Court ordered that the “Settlement
7 Administrator provide Notice for the Class pursuant to the terms of the Settlement
8 Agreement no later than February 27, 2017.” *Id.* at 16 (bolding removed). Each of
9 the Settlement’s Notice provisions was implemented as set out in the Settlement and
10 instructed by the Court. Indeed, the notice plan has been more successful than even
11 anticipated by the settlement administrator. *See* Weisbrot Decl. at ¶¶ 6-9. To start,
12 every Class Member for whom Defendant had contact information received direct
13 notice via email. *See id.* ¶ 5. The internet banner notice portion of the Notice Plan
14 ran for 8 consecutive weeks and served a total of 12,836,997 impressions, 2,436,997
15 more impressions than anticipated in Mr. Weisbrot’s November 18, 2016
16 Declaration (Doc. 103-4). *See id.* ¶ 6. The social media portion of the notice
17 program utilized Facebook to deliver a total of 2,707,658 impressions, 207,658 more
18 than anticipated. *See id.* ¶ 7. In sum, the social media and internet banner portions
19 of the Notice Plan, which constitute the bulk of the entire Notice Plan, were more
20 than 20% more successful than anticipated.

21 To satisfy the notice requirements of the CLRA, four 1/2 page ads featuring
22 the Summary Notice were published in the California regional edition of USA today.
23 *Id.* ¶ 8. The ad size was increased from 1/4 page to 1/2 page to accommodate the full
24 text of the Summary Notice. *Id.*

25 In addition, a link to the Settlement Website was included on Millennium’s
26 company website, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram pages, which reach hundreds of
27 thousands of consumers who are most likely to purchase the Subject Products. *See*
28 *id.* ¶ 10. The success of the Notice Plan can also be seen though the fact that the

1 Settlement Website received almost a million page views. *See id.* ¶ 11. Further, the
2 settlement toll-free hotline received 133 calls and 22 requests to have the Claim
3 Form and/or Long Form mailed. *Id.* ¶ 12. The Settlement Administrator also
4 received and, where appropriate, responded to over 200 emails received regarding
5 the Settlement, mailing 58 Claim Forms and/or Long Form Notices upon request. *Id.*
6 ¶ 13.

7 The Settlement Administrator estimates that the “notice program delivered an
8 approximate 87% reach,” which exceeds the already outstanding 85% reach
9 contemplated in the Mr. Weisbrot’s November 18, 2016 Declaration. *Id.* ¶ 9. The
10 calculated 87% reach does not even account for email notice, print publication in the
11 regional edition of USA Today, the settlement website, the toll-free hotline, and
12 posting of a link to the Settlement Website on Millennium’s website and social
13 media platforms. *Id.* ¶¶ 9-10. The 87% reach is the hallmark of a great notice
14 program, and certainly within the range of approval. *See, e.g., In re Online DVD-*
15 *Rental Antitrust Litig.*, 779 F.3d 934, 945–46 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming approval of
16 notice plan based on rental records using both regular and email); *Wilson v.*
17 *Airborne, Inc.*, 2008 WL 3854963, at * 4 (C.D. Cal., Aug. 13, 2008) (approving
18 program reaching 80% of class members); *Federal Judicial Center Judges’ Class*
19 *Action Notice and Claims Process Checklist*, at
20 [www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/NotCheck.pdf/\\$file/NotCheck.pdf](http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/NotCheck.pdf/$file/NotCheck.pdf) (“A high
21 reach, e.g. between 70-95% can often reasonably be reached by a notice campaign”);
22 *Silber v. Mabon*, 18 F.3d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (notice need not actually reach
23 every single class member; instead, the notice need only be reasonably calculated,
24 under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
25 action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections).

26 The success of the Notice Plan is also plainly clear based on the fact that,
27 should the Court grant Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Reimbursement of
28

1 Expenses, and Payment of Incentive Awards, the entire \$8.25 million Settlement
2 Fund will be exhausted. Although the Settlement Administrator is still in the process
3 of conducting audits to identify the total final number of timely and valid claims, it
4 currently estimates that it has received 173,000 timely and valid Claim Form
5 submissions. Further, despite the fact that the banner ad portion of the Notice Plan
6 served more than 15.5 million impressions, the Settlement Website received almost a
7 million page views, and the consumers made numerous hotline calls and emails to
8 the Settlement Administrator, to date, not a single person has objected to any part of
9 the Settlement. Only two people have so far requested to be excluded.

10 **V. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS FAIR, ADEQUATE, AND**
11 **REASONABLE**

12 **A. The Settlement Was The Product Of Serious, Informed**
13 **Litigation And Non-Collusive Negotiations**

14 As this Court noted, “[i]n general, evidence that a settlement agreement is
15 arrived at through genuine arms’ length bargaining after factual discovery supports a
16 conclusion that the settlement is fair.” 1/31/17 Order Granting Preliminary Approval
17 at 9 (citing *City P’ship Co. v. Atl. Acquisition Ltd. P’ship*, 100 F.3d 1041, 1043 (1st
18 Cir. 1996) (“When sufficient discovery has been provided and the parties have
19 bargained at arms’ length, there is a presumption in favor of the settlement.”); *Ross*
20 *v. Trex Co., Inc.*, 2013 WL 6622919, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2013); *Fernandez v. Victoria*
21 *Secret Stores, LLC*, 2008 WL 8150856, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2008); *see also*
22 *Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp.*, 563 F. 3d 948, 965 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We put a
23 good deal of stock in the product of an arms-length, non-collusive, negotiated
24 resolution[.]”). Here, there can be no question that the Settlement was reached
25 through arms’ length negotiations between fully informed parties.

26 As discussed at length in Plaintiffs’ two motions for preliminary approval and
27 this Court’s Order, the Settlement “is the result of eight months of arms’ length
28 negotiations that included three sessions of formal in-person and telephonic

1 mediation before Jill R. Sperber, Esq. of Judicate West.” *Id.* at 9. “After the first
2 two mediation session in March and May of 2016, the parties reached their first
3 settlement in principle and applied for preliminary approval of the settlement
4 agreement.” *Id.* After the Court denied the motion on September 21, 2016, the
5 parties renewed their settlement negotiations to address the Court’s concerns.” *Id.*
6 “On October 7, 2016, the parties participated in a third mediation with Ms. Sperber,
7 reaching a new settlement agreement in principle.” *Id.*

8 Further, “prior to entering into the Settlement Agreement,” the parties
9 “engaged in extensive litigation, bringing several motions to dismiss and conducting
10 thorough discovery and investigation into the merits of the case.” *Id.* “For example,
11 the parties met and conferred frequently concerning various discovery requests, and
12 in response, Millennium produced thousands of pages of documents, including test
13 results and sales information.” *Id.* “Plaintiffs also provided Millennium with their
14 own test results, consumer surveys, and other materials obtained through their own
15 research and investigation.” *Id.* “Plaintiffs served subpoenas on several third parties
16 that produced testing results and internal communications concerning Millennium’s
17 products.” *Id.* “Each party, through respective counsel, conducted a thorough
18 examination and evaluation of the relevant law, facts and allegations in order to
19 assess the merits of Plaintiffs’ case, including an investigation into the facts and law
20 concerning (1) label design and product formulation; (2) marketing and advertising
21 of products; (3) sales, pricing, and financial data, and (4) the sufficiency of the
22 claims and suitability for class certification.” *Id.* “[E]ach of the three mediation
23 sessions was followed by settlement discussions during which the terms of the
24 agreement were extensively debated and negotiated.” *Id.* (quotations omitted).

25 As this Court held, “the fact that the Settlement Agreement was reached
26 through arms’ length negotiations after three mediation sessions with Ms. Sperber
27 and almost two years of discovery, investigation and negotiation weighs in favor of
28

1 finding that the Settlement Agreement is a result of fair and honest negotiations.” *Id.*
2 at 10. The Court should make the same finding here again.

3 **B. Strength Of Plaintiffs’ Case**

4 In determining the likelihood of a plaintiff’s success on the merits of a class
5 action, “the district court’s determination is nothing more than an amalgam of
6 delicate balancing, gross approximations and rough justice.” *Officers for Justice*,
7 688 F.2d at 625 (internal quotations omitted). The court may “presume that through
8 negotiation, the Parties, counsel, and mediator arrived at a reasonable range of
9 settlement by considering Plaintiff’s likelihood of recovery.” *Garner v. State Farm*.
10 *Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 2010 WL 1687832, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2010) (citing
11 *Rodriguez*, 563 F.3d at 965). Here, the settlement negotiations were hard-fought,
12 requiring multiple mediation sessions over several months, with both Parties and
13 their counsel thoroughly familiar with the applicable facts, legal theories, and
14 defenses on both sides. Plaintiffs believe that the Settlement is an outstanding result
15 considering the issues addressed below.

16 In false or misleading advertising cases concerning beverages or foods,
17 plaintiffs are typically foreclosed from full-refund theories of damages at class
18 certification. *See, e.g., In re POM Wonderful LLC*, 2014 WL 1225184, at *2-*3
19 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2014) (explaining that a full refund damages model is
20 unavailable where the beverage at issue provided class members with benefits in the
21 form of calories, hydration, vitamins, and minerals); *Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc.*, 2012
22 WL 8019257, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Apr.12, 2012). Here, the Subject Products contain
23 multiple vitamins, enzymes and probiotics, and provide hydration and calories.
24 Defendants would have strong arguments against a full damages model for relief.

25 Although Plaintiffs believe that proving price premium damages would be
26 possible here, there is no guarantee that the ultimate price premium proved would
27 justify the risk of further litigation. As to the alcohol claims, it would be difficult to
28

1 establish a price premium because Millennium’s alcoholic kombucha beverages (the
2 “Classic” line) and the purported non-alcoholic beverages (the “Enlightened” line)
3 *retail for the exact same price at the same retail locations*. Even if Plaintiffs were to
4 establish an alcohol labeling problem, the alcohol levels of kombucha products
5 necessarily vary over time due to an ongoing fermentation process. Thus, the
6 amount of alcohol in the accused products varies greatly between purchases, with
7 some class members potentially receiving Enlightened products below and above the
8 0.5% alcohol by volume threshold. Further, the alcohol labeling claims would likely
9 devolve into an uncertain “battle of the experts.” Millennium produced 1,394 tests
10 of the alcohol concentration of Enlightened kombucha beverages spanning several
11 years within the Class Period. Every single test showed that the beverages were
12 *below* the federally mandated 0.5% threshold set for non-alcoholic beverages.

13 Plaintiffs would face similar issues with their claims concerning the alleged
14 high amounts of sugar in the Subject Products. The Subject Products contain
15 varying amounts of sugar, and, due to the natural fermentation of the products,² the
16 amount of sugar varies over time, such that Plaintiffs would have to present a viable
17 damages theory in the face of likely evidence that some Class Members were not
18 injured at all, while others may have been depending on the time the Subject
19 Products remained on the shelves. Further, these inconsistencies would present
20 issues as to commonality and predominance at class certification.

21 With regards to Plaintiffs’ claims concerning antioxidants, Plaintiffs would
22 face a strong hurdle at class certification and summary judgment to establish
23 damages considering that some antioxidants (*e.g.*, catechins) are actually present in
24 the Subject Products, just not the antioxidant “nutrients” mandated by federal and
25 state law. *See, e.g., Khasin v. R. C. Bigelow*, 2016 WL 4504500, at *3-*6 (N.D. Cal.

26
27 ² The bacteria in the Subject Products allegedly “eats” the sugar and converts it into
28 alcohol.

1 Aug. 29, 2016) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendant in antioxidant
2 labeling case where it was undisputed that the tea beverage contained *some*
3 antioxidants). Nonetheless, Plaintiffs' review of the literature regarding consumer
4 willingness to pay for labeling statements touting a product's antioxidant content
5 shows that class members likely paid a roughly four percent premium based on the
6 antioxidant representations at issue here. *See* Armenak Markosyan, *et al.*, *Consumer*
7 *Response to Information about a Functional Food Product: Apples Enriched with*
8 *Antioxidants*, *Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 325, 337 (2009)
9 (concluding that customers are willing to pay a 4 percent price premium for a
10 product advertised as being enriched with antioxidants).

11 Defendants vigorously deny Plaintiffs' allegations and assert that neither
12 Plaintiffs nor the Class suffered any harm or damages. In addition, Defendants
13 would no doubt present a vigorous defense at trial, and there is no assurance that the
14 Class would prevail – or even if they did, that they would be able to obtain an award
15 of damages significantly higher than achieved here absent such risks. Thus, in the
16 eyes of Class Counsel, the proposed Settlement provides the Class with an
17 outstanding opportunity to obtain significant relief at this stage in the litigation. The
18 Settlement also abrogates the risks that might prevent them from obtaining *any* relief.

19 **C. The Settlement Provides Exceptional Relief For The Class**

20 **1. The Vast Majority Of Claimants Will Be Made More**
21 **Than Whole For Their Damages**

22 As discussed *supra*, it would be difficult for Plaintiffs to establish price
23 premium damages above four percent of the purchase price. Assuming that Plaintiffs
24 were to prevail at trial and prove damages at four percent of the \$3.50 retail price,
25 damages would be set at 14 cents per Subject Product purchased during the Class
26 Period. Although the Settlement Administrator is still in the process of conducting
27 audits to identify the total final number of timely and valid claims, based on the
28

1 current estimates, each Class Member that has submitted a timely and valid claim
2 will receive roughly \$3.15 in cash or vouchers³ for each Subject Product purchased,
3 up to \$31.50 for 10 Subject Products. *See* Weisbrot Decl. ¶ 16 (“Although final
4 claim numbers and claim administration costs are not yet final, Angeion projects that
5 Class Members will receive a 10 percent pro rata diminishment of their submitted
6 claims to account for the high amount of claims and expenses, such that the entire
7 \$8.25 million fund will be exhausted.”). Class members can thus potentially receive
8 full recovery for the price premium attributable to the purchase of up to 225 Subject
9 Products within the Class Period without providing proof of purchase. Indeed, even
10 if a class member were to make a claim for a single cash award of \$3.15, that class
11 member would recover the price premium attributable to the purchase of 22
12 products. The significant relief provided here clearly favors settlement approval.
13 *See, e.g., Hendricks v. Starkist Co.*, 2016 WL 5462423, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29,
14 2016) (“Testing showed that there was an average underfill between 4.5% and
15 16.7%, resulting in damages between 3.87 cents and 14.3 cents per can. A \$1.97
16 cash payment would provide full recovery for 13 to 50 cans and a voucher of \$4.43
17 would provide full recovery for 30 to 114 cans. Accordingly, this factor weighs in
18 favor of settlement as well.”) (citations omitted). Indeed, as the Court previously
19 noted, the amounts that class members can recover pursuant to the Settlement “*vastly*
20 *exceeds the potential recovery at trial based on a price premium model.*” *See*
21 1/31/17 Order Granting Preliminary Approval at 11 (emphasis added).

22
23 ³ The voucher option is valued at “100 cents on the dollar” here because class
24 members are given a choice between choosing cash or vouchers, and because the
25 vouchers have no expiration date, are freely transferrable, and are redeemable at any
26 retailer that sells the Subject Products. *Hendricks v. Starkist Co.*, 2016 WL 5462423,
27 at *7, *10 n. 3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2016) (finding that “vouchers are valued at 100
28 cents on the dollar” where the vouchers have no expiration date, are freely
transferrable, and are redeemable at any retailer that sells the products). The
Settlement Administrator estimates that about 3.2 percent of all valid and timely
claims submitted were for the voucher, as opposed to the cash, option. Weisbrot
Decl. ¶ 14.

1 **2. The Settlement Is Proportionate To The Class' Overall**
2 **Damages**

3 Considering Plaintiffs' damages theories and real risks inherent in continued
4 litigation, the total fund available to pay all claims—\$8,250,000—fits squarely
5 within the “range of possible approval.” *See id.* The Settlement aims to settle all
6 claims “from March 11, 2011 up to and including the Notice Date.” Settlement ¶ 10.
7 From March of 2011 through the end of October of 2016, Millennium sold
8 approximately 274,715,000 bottles of the Subject Products to its distributors.
9 Accounting for the four months between October 2016 and the end of the class
10 period, Plaintiffs' counsel estimates that Millennium sold approximately 291 million
11 bottles of the Subject Products to its distributors within the class period. Although
12 the precise amount of bottles sold at retail locations during this time period is not
13 known, it is presumably smaller than the 291 million unit figure due to unsold
14 inventory at retail locations. However, even assuming that all 291 million bottles
15 were sold at retail, and assuming that Plaintiffs could prevail in showing damages at
16 14 cents per bottle as discussed above, the total maximum recovery available at trial
17 would be roughly \$40.7 million. Thus, as the Court found in its order granting
18 preliminary approval, the total fund made available by the Settlement represents
19 *more than 20 percent of potential recovery at trial.* *See* 1/31/17 Order Granting
20 Preliminary Approval at 11. This result certainly “falls well within the range of
21 possible approval.” *See id.* *See also Hendricks*, 2016 WL 5462423, at *5 (“The
22 \$12,000,000 settlement amount, while consisting only a single-digit percentage of
23 the maximum potential exposure, is reasonable given the stage of the proceedings
24 and the defenses asserted in this action.”); *Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.*,
25 2015 WL 3776765, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2015) (granting final approval of a net
26 settlement amount representing 7.3 % of the plaintiffs' potential recovery at trial);
27 *Balderas v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC*, 2014 WL 3610945, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
28 July 21, 2014) (granting preliminary approval of a net settlement amount

1 representing 5 % of the projected maximum recovery at trial); *Ma v. Covidien*
2 *Holding, Inc.*, 2914 WL 360196, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2014) (finding a settlement
3 worth 9.1 % of the total value of the action “within the range of reasonableness”).
4 *See also Downey Surgical Clinic, Inc. v. Optuminsight, Inc.*, 2016 WL 5938722 at *5
5 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2016) (*this* Court granting final approval where recovery was as
6 low as 3.21 % of potential recovery at trial).

7 Further, “claims-made settlements ... are routinely approved by the Ninth
8 Circuit and Courts in California.” *See Nur v. Tatitlek Support Services, Inc.*, 2016
9 WL 3039573, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2016) (characterizing a string-cite of 16
10 cases as “only a small sample of those cases”). Here, however, there will be no
11 reversion of any kind to Defendant should the Court grant Plaintiffs’ counsel’s
12 motion for attorney’s fees and costs. In other words, while styled as a “claims-
13 made” settlement, the Settlement is more analogous to a true common fund
14 settlement, as the entire \$8.25 million fund will be exhausted. Accordingly, the
15 Court should have no concerns about the \$8.25 million figure being “illusory” based
16 on the claims-made structure of the Settlement. Every single dollar made available
17 by the \$8.25 million fund will be distributed.

18 **D. The Risk Of Continuing Litigation and Maintaining Class**
19 **Action Status**

20 As referenced above, proceeding in this litigation in the absence of settlement
21 poses various risks such as failing to certify a class, having summary judgment
22 granted against Plaintiffs, or losing at trial. Such considerations have been found to
23 weigh heavily in favor of settlement. *See Rodriguez*, 563 F.3d at 966; *Curtis-Bauer*
24 *v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.*, 2008 WL 4667090, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2008)
25 (“Settlement avoids the complexity, delay, risk and expense of continuing with the
26 litigation and will produce a prompt, certain, and substantial recovery for the
27 Plaintiff class.”). Even assuming that Plaintiffs were to survive summary judgment,
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1 they would face the risk of establishing liability at trial in light of conflicting expert
2 testimony between their own expert witnesses and Defendants’ expert witnesses. In
3 this “battle of experts,” it is virtually impossible to predict with any certainty which
4 testimony would be credited, and ultimately, which expert version would be accepted
5 by the jury. The experience of Class Counsel has taught them that these
6 considerations can make the ultimate outcome of a trial highly uncertain. Moreover,
7 even if Plaintiffs prevailed at trial, in light of the possible damage theories that could
8 be presented by both sides, there is a substantial likelihood based on the above
9 analysis that Class Members may be awarded significantly less than is offered to
10 them under this Settlement on an individual basis. By settling, Plaintiffs and the
11 Class avoid these risks, as well as the delays and risks of the appellate process. See
12 1/31/2017 Order Granting Preliminary Approval at 12 (“in particular considering the
13 risks and expenses associated with continued litigation, the Court finds that the
14 settlement amount falls within the range of approval”).

15 **E. The Response Of Class Members Has Been**
16 **Overwhelmingly Positive**

17 While the objection and opt-out deadlines have not yet passed (both are due on
18 July 3), the lack of significant opposition to the settlement militates in favor of
19 finally approving the settlement. *Marshall v. Holiday Magic, Inc.*, 550 F.2d 1173,
20 1178 (9th Cir. 1977) (objection by only 1% of class supports approval); *Churchill*
21 *Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec.*, 361 F.3d 566, 577 (9th Cir. 2004) (500 opt outs and 45
22 objections out of 90,000 class members indicates support for settlement). To date,
23 there have been only two opt-outs and no objections. See Weisbrot Decl. ¶ 17. Even
24 if a few class members end up objecting, a small number of objectors “strongly
25 supports the fairness of the settlement” and should not stand in the way of final
26 approval. *Shames v. Hertz Corp.*, 2012 WL 5392159, at * 8 (S.D. Cal., Nov. 5,
27 2012) (“The small number of objections and class members who opted out of the
28

1 settlement, when compared to the large number of class members, favors
2 approval.”). Indeed, the fact that 173,000 valid and timely claims have been
3 submitted strongly supports that the Settlement enjoys the support of the Class.

4 **F. The Views Of Experienced Counsel Support Approving**
5 **This Settlement**

6 “The recommendations of plaintiffs’ counsel should be given a presumption of
7 reasonableness.” *In re Omnivision Techs., Inc.*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (N.D.
8 Cal. 2008). Deference to Class Counsel’s evaluation of the Settlement is appropriate
9 because “[p]arties represented by competent counsel are better positioned than courts
10 to produce a settlement that fairly reflects each party’s expected outcome in
11 litigation.” *Rodriguez*, 563 F.3d at 967. Here, the Settlement was negotiated by
12 counsel with extensive experience in consumer class action litigation. *See*
13 Declaration of L. Timothy Fisher, Ex. 1 (firm resume of Bursor & Fisher, P.A.).
14 Based on their experience, Class Counsel concluded that the Settlement provides
15 exceptional results for the class while sparing the class from the uncertainties of
16 continued and protracted litigation.

17 For all the foregoing reasons, the Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable,
18 and should be preliminarily approved.

19 **VI. CONCLUSION**

20 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant
21 final approval to the Settlement Agreement, certify the Settlement Class, and enter
22 the Final Approval Order in the form submitted herewith.
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27
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1 Dated: June 19, 2017

Respectfully submitted,

2 **BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.**

3 By: /s/ L. Timothy Fisher
4 L. Timothy Fisher

5 L. Timothy Fisher (State Bar No. 191626)
6 Yeremey O. Krivoshey (State Bar No.295032)
7 1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940
8 Walnut Creek, CA 94596
9 Telephone: (925) 300-4455
Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
Email: ltfisher@bursor.com
ykrivoshey@bursor.com

10 *Attorneys for Plaintiffs*

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